Abstract. COWS is a recently defined process calculus for specifying and combining service-oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic behaviour. Since its introduction, a number of methods and tools have been devised to analyse COWS specifications, like e.g. a type system to check confidentiality properties, a logic and a model checker to express and check functional properties of services. In this paper, by means of a case study in the area of automotive systems, we demonstrate that COWS, with some mild linguistic additions, can model all the phases of the life cycle of service-oriented applications, such as publication, discovery, negotiation, deployment and execution. We also provide a flavour of the properties that can be analysed by using the tools mentioned above.
Introduction
In recent years, the increasing success of e-business, e-learning, e-government, and other similar emerging models, has led the World Wide Web, initially thought of as a system for human use, to evolve towards an architecture for service-oriented computing (SOC) supporting automated use. SOC advocates the use of loosely coupled 'services', to be understood as autonomous, platform-independent, computational entities that can be described, published, discovered, and assembled, as the basic blocks for building interoperable and evolvable systems and applications. While early examples of technologies that are at least partly service-oriented date back to CORBA, DCOM, J2EE and IBM WebSphere, the most successful instantiation of the SOC paradigm are probably the more recent web services. These are sets of operations that can be published, located and invoked through the Web via XML messages complying with given standard formats. To support the web service approach, several new languages and technologies have been designed and many international companies have invested a lot of efforts.
Current software engineering technologies for SOC, however, remain at the descriptive level and lack rigorous formal foundations. We are still experiencing a gap between practice (programming) and theory (formal methods and analysis techniques) in the design of SOC applications. The challenges come from the necessity of dealing at once with issues like communication, co-operation, resource usage, security, failures, etc. in a setting where demands and guarantees can be very different for the many different components. Many researchers have hence put forward the idea of using process calculi, a cornerstone of current foundational research on specification and analysis of concurrent, distributed and mobile systems through mathematical -mainly algebraic and logical -tools. Thus, many process calculi have been designed, addressing one aspect or another of SOC and aiming at assessing the adequacy of diverse sets of primitives w.r.t. modelling, combining and analyzing service-oriented applications.
Due to their algebraic nature, process calculi convey in a distilled form the compositional programming style of SOC. Thus, for example, many well-known problems related to services composition (e.g., messages not received, race conditions, deadlocks, incompatible behaviours) could be investigated through an adequate and sufficiently expressive process calculus. A major benefit of using process calculi is that they enjoy a rich repertoire of elegant meta-theories, proof techniques and analytical tools that can be likely tailored to the needs of service-based applications. It has been already argued that type systems, model checking and (bi)simulation analysis provide adequate tools to address topics relevant to the web services technology (see e.g. [15, 20] ). This 'proof technology' can eventually pave the way for the development of automatic property validation tools. Therefore, process calculi might play a central role in laying rigorous methodological foundations for specification and validation of SOC applications.
By taking inspiration from well-known process calculi and from the standard language for orchestration of web services WS-BPEL [18] , in [10] we have designed COWS (Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services), a process calculus for specifying and combining service-oriented applications, while modelling their dynamic behaviour. We have shown that COWS can model different and typical features of web services, such as, e.g., multiple start activities, receive conflicts, routing of correlated messages, service instances and interactions among them. Since its definition, some linguistic extensions have been introduced to model timed activities [12] and dynamic service discovery and negotiation [14] , thus obtaining a linguistic formalism capable of modelling all the phases of the life cycle of service-oriented applications. Moreover, a number of methods and tools have been devised to analyse COWS specifications, such as the stochastic extension defined in [19] to enable quantitative reasoning on service behaviours, the type system introduced in [13] to check confidentiality properties, and the logic and model checker presented in [6] to express and check functional properties of services. In this paper, by means of a case study in the area of automotive systems, we provide a flavour of COWS main features and specification style, and illustrate the classes of properties that can be analysed by using some of the tools mentioned above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 'on road assistance scenario', a case study in the area of automotive systems that will be used throughout the paper for illustration purposes. Section 3 presents syntax and main features of COWS; this is done in a step-by-step fashion while modelling some services within the scenario and their orchestration. Section 4 shows that also dynamic service discovery and SLA negotiation can be naturally modelled in COWS by exploiting some mild linguistic additions, i.e. timed activities, constraints and operations on them. Section 5 sums up a type-based approach that enables expressing and enforcing confidentiality properties. Section 6 illustrates a logical verification framework including the logic SocL for expressing services functional properties and the on-the-fly model checker CMC for verifying them. Section 7 concludes the paper with some final remarks.
On road assistance scenario
The 'on road assistance scenario' is one of the scenarios in the area of automotive systems defined within the EU project S which describes some functionalities that will be likely available in the near future. The scenario involves a number of services that are discovered and bound at run-time according to levels of service specified at design time, so as to deliver the best available functionalities at agreed levels of quality. A brief description follows.
The in-vehicle diagnostic system reports a severe failure when the car is no longer drivable. The car's discovery system then identifies garages, car rentals and towing truck services in the car's vicinity. At this point, the car's reasoner system selects a set of adequate services taking into account personalised policies and preferences of the driver, e.g. balancing cost and delay, and tries to order them. Before being enable to order services, the owner of the car has to deposit a security payment, that will be given back if ordering the services fails. Other components of the in-vehicle service platform involved in this assistance activity are a GPS service, providing the car's current location, and an orchestrator, coordinating all the described services.
An UML-like activity diagram of the orchestration of services is shown in Figure 1 . For simplicity, we assume that the orchestration is only triggered either by an 'engine failure' or by a 'low oil level' sensor signal. The process starts with a request from the orchestrator to the bank to charge the driver's credit card with the security deposit payment. This is modelled by the UML action requestCardCharge for charging the credit card whose number is provided as an output parameter of the action call. In parallel to the interaction with the bank, the orchestrator requests the current location of the car from the car's internal GPS service. The current location is modelled as an input to the requestLocation action and subsequently used by the findServices interaction which retrieves a list of services. If no service can be found, an action to compensate the credit card charge will be launched. For the selection of services, the orchestrator synchronises with the reasoner service to obtain the most appropriate (best) services.
Service ordering is modelled by the UML actions orderGarage, orderTowTruck and orderRentalCar. When the orchestrator makes an appointment with the garage, the diagnostic data are automatically transferred to the garage, which could then be able, e.g., to identify the spare parts needed to perform the repair. Then, the orchestrator makes an appointment with the towing service, providing the GPS data of the stranded vehicle and of the garage, to tow the vehicle to the garage. Concurrently, the orchestrator makes an appointment with the rental service, by indicating the location where the car will be handed over to the driver.
The workflow described in Figure 1 models the overall behaviour of the system. Besides interactions among services, it also includes activities using concepts developed for long running business transactions. These activities entail fault and compensation handling, kind of specific activities attempting to reverse the effects of previously committed activities, that are an important aspect of SOC applications. Specifically, in the considered scenario, the security deposit payment charged to the driver's credit card 
(protection, delimitation, replication) Table 1 . COWS syntax must be revoked if either the discovery phase does not succeed or ordering the services fails, i.e. both garage/tow truck and car rental services reject the requests. Moreover, if ordering a tow truck fails, the garage appointment has to be cancelled and the rental car delivery has to be redirected to the stranded car's actual location. Instead, if ordering the car rental fails, the overall process may not fail, as the activity is enclosed in a sub-transaction.
COWS: a Calculus for Orchestration of Web Services
In this section, we report the syntax of COWS and explain the semantics of its primitives in a step-by-step fashion while modelling the on road assistance scenario (the complete specification can be found in [11] ). Due to lack of space, here we only provide an informal account of the semantics of COWS and refer the interested reader to [10, 9] for a formal presentation, for examples illustrating peculiarities and expressiveness of the language, and for comparisons with other process-based and orchestration formalisms.
To get accustomed to using the language one can also use CMC [1] , a tool supporting the automated derivation of all computations originating from a COWS term.
Syntax
The syntax of COWS, given in Table 1 , is parameterized by three countable and pairwise disjoint sets: the set of (killer) labels (ranged over by k, k , . . .), the set of values (ranged over by v, v , . . . ) and the set of 'write once' variables (ranged over by x, y, . . . ). The set of values is left unspecified; however, we assume that it includes the set of names, ranged over by n, m, o, p, . . . , mainly used to represent partners and operations. The language is also parameterized by a set of expressions, ranged over by e, whose exact syntax is deliberately omitted. We just assume that expressions contain, at least, values and variables, but do not include killer labels (that, hence, are not communicable values).
We use w to range over values and variables, u to range over names and variables, and d to range over killer labels, names and variables. Notation· stands for tuples of objects, e.g.x is a compact notation for denoting the tuple of variables x 1 , . . . , x n (with n ≥ 0). In the sequel, we shall use 0 to denote empty choice and + to abbreviate binary choice. We will omit trailing occurrences of 0, writing e.g. 
Basic operators for service orchestration
The COWS term representing the 'orchestration' of all services within the scenario is
The services above are composed by using the parallel composition operator | that allows the different components to be concurrently executed and to interact with each other. o can be interpreted as a specific implementation of operation o provided by the service identified by the logic name p. An inter-service communication takes place when the arguments of a receive and of a concurrent invoke along the same endpoint do match, and causes substitution of the variables arguments of the receive with the corresponding values arguments of the invoke (within the scope of variables declarations). For example, variable x carData , declared local to Orchestrator by means of the delimitation operator, is initialized by the receive leading the recovery activity with data provided by SensorsMonitor. Notice that, while executing a recovery behaviour, Orchestrator does not accept other recovery requests. We are also assuming that it is restarted at the end of the recovery task.
The recovery behaviour s engfail executed when an engine failure occurs is
• o e is a scoped endpoint along which successful termination signals (i.e. communications that carry no data) are exchanged to orchestrate execution of the different components. Variables x loc , x list and x garageGPS are used to store the value of the car's current location, the list of closer on road services discovered and the garage's GPS location, respectively. To present the specification of s engfail in terms of the UML actions of Fig. 1 , we have used an auxiliary 'sequence' notation. Thus, e.g., requestLocation. findServices indicates that execution of requestLocation terminates before execution of findServices starts. Indeed, requestLocation. findServices actually stands for the COWS term
where requestLocation and findServices are
Endpoints of service invocations can also contain variables as is the case, e.g., of the term below.
Here, variable x garage is used to invoke a garage service whose partner name is unknown at design time. This garage will be selected dynamically by activity selectService that, through a communication, replaces x garage with the actual partner name of the garage. Indeed, in COWS service reconfiguration and dynamic binding of discovered services rely on the exchange of partner and operation names in communication.
Bank, the last service we show in this section, can serve multiple requests simultaneously. This behaviour is modelled by exploiting the replication operator * to spawn in parallel as many copies of its argument term as necessary. The definition of Bank is
Once prompted by a request, differently from Orchestrator, Bank creates one specific instance to serve that request and is immediately ready to concurrently serve other requests. Notably, each instance exploits communication on 'internal' operations o checkOK and o checkFail to model a conditional choice, and creates a new 'charge identifier' by means of the delimitation operator (that acts here as the restriction operator of the π-calculus [16] ). Thus, if after some invocations the service receives a message along the endpoint p bank
• o revoke to revoke a request, a certain number of service instances could be able to accept it. However, the message is routed to the proper instance by exploiting the unique charge identifier chargeID as a correlation value.
Fault and compensation handling
We now show how to modify the specification described in the previous section for adding the fault and compensation activities depicted in Figure 1 . For improving readability, these activities are highlighted by a gray background to distinguish them from 'normal behaviour'. For example, the term modelling the garage ordering is:
Thus, if ordering a garage fails, the compensation of the credit card charge is invoked by sending a signal cc (abbreviation of 'card charge') along the endpoint p car
• o undo and the rental car delivery is redirected by assigning the car's current location x loc to the variable x garageGPS (this assignment is modelled by means of communication along the private endpoint p • o). Otherwise, a compensation handler is installed that is invoked whenever tow truck ordering fails and, in that case, attempts to cancel the garage order and to compensate the credit card charge and the rental car order.
To model fault handling and compensation behaviours, the term orderGarage exploits interactions along the endpoint p car
• o undo . However, to better support the specification of these aspects, COWS provides two further constructs. Kill activities of the form kill(k), where k is a killer label, can be used to force termination of all unprotected parallel terms inside the enclosing [k] , that stops the killing effect. Kill activities are executed eagerly with respect to the other parallel activities but critical code, such as e.g. fault/compensation signals and handlers, can be protected from the effect of a forced termination by using the protection operator {| | }. By exploiting these new features, the recovery behaviour s engfail becomes
where requestCardCharge and findServices are defined as 
Service publication, discovery and negotiation
We have shown so far that COWS can model service specification, orchestration and reconfiguration. Now we focus on other important phases of the life cycle of serviceoriented applications, such as publication, discovery, and negotiation. In fact, in a service-oriented architecture, services can play essentially three different roles: the provider, the requester and the registry. Providers offer functionalities and publish machine-readable service descriptions on registries to enable automated discover and invocation by requesters. In addition to the function that the service performs, service descriptions also include non-functional properties, such as e.g., response time, availability, reliability, security, and performance, that jointly represent the quality of the service (QoS). Some of these properties could depend on the current run-time configuration of the system (e.g. the maximum allowed bandwidth might depend on the actual load of the server), thus a dynamic discovery process is often needed to find a provider that meets the requesters' requirements. Moreover, since services are often developed and run by different organizations, a key issue of the discovery process is to define a flexible negotiation mechanism that allows two or more parties to reach a joint agreement about cost and quality of a service, prior to service execution. The outcome of the negotiation phase is a Service Level Agreement (SLA), i.e. a contract among the involved parties (service requester and provider and, possibly, some third parties) that sets out both type and bounds on various performance metrics of the service to be provided, and the remedial actions to be performed if these are not met.
We want now to demonstrate that service publication, discovery and SLA negotiation can be naturally modelled in COWS by exploiting the additions of 'timed' activities and 'constraints'. Timed activities have been introduced in [12] , since it is not known to what extent timed computation can be reduced to untimed forms of computation [21] . Specifically, COWS is extended with a WS-BPEL-like wait activity of the form e , that suspends the execution of the invoking service until the time interval whose duration is specified as an argument has elapsed and can be used as a guard for the choice operator. Constraints have been introduced in [14] , by exploiting the fact that COWS's definition is parameterised with respect to a few sets of objects, namely the set of values and that of expressions that operate on them. Notably, it is not taken a definite standing on which of the many kind of constraints to use, such as crisp constraints (that can only be satisfied or violated) and soft constraints (that can be satisfied with multiple consistency levels, which are usually expressed by means of c-semiring [2] and interpreted as levels of preference or importance). From time to time, the appropriate kind of constraints to work with should be chosen depending on what one intends to model.
Still in [14] we show that the concurrent constraint computing model can be easily mimicked in COWS. This model of computation is based on a shared store of constraints that provides partial information about possible values that program variables can assume. The programs running in parallel with the store can act on it by performing operations for adding/removing constraints to/from the store (tell and retract, respectively), and for checking entailment/consistency of a constraint by/with the store (ask and check, respectively). Due to lack of space, we refer the interested reader to [14] for details. For the rest of this section, suffice it to know that in COWS a store of constraints can be represented by a sort of 'memory cell' service (accessed in mutual exclusion) containing a multiset of constraints. It is denoted by store C , where C is the multiset of constraints currently contained, and can be manipulated by concurrent services by means of the operations tell, retract, ask and check.
Now, like in cc-pi [3] , service descriptions and SLA requirements can be expressed as constraints that can be dynamically generated and composed, and that can be used by the involved parties both for service publication and discovery, and for the SLA negotiation process. Consistency of the set of constraints resulting from negotiation means that the agreement has been reached. Timed activities can be exploited to allow services not to get stuck forever waiting on a receive.
We use on road assistance scenario to illustrate all such features and mechanisms at work. Initially, each on road service has to publish its service description on a service registry. For example, assume that a garage service description consists of: a string identifying the kind of provided service, the provider's partner name, and a constraint that defines the garage location. Now, by assuming that the registry provides the operation o pub by means of the partner name p reg , a garage service can request the publication of its description as follows:
where gps is a (global) constraint variable. These variables are used to avoid that taking place of communication can make the store inconsistent (see [14] ). In fact, they are not affected by substitution application and, to better distinguish them from COWS variables, are written in the typewriter style (e.g. x, y, . . . ). The service registry can be defined as
For each publication request received along the endpoint p reg • o pub from a provider service, the registry service outputs a service description along the private endpoint p reg
• o DB . The parallel composition of all these outputs represents the database of the registry. The subservice R search , serving the searching requests, is defined as
When a searching request is received along p reg • o search , the registry service initializes a new local store (delimitation [p s ] makes store ∅ local) by adding the constraint within the query message. Then, it cyclically reads a description (whose first field is the string specified by the client) from the internal database, checks if the provider constraints are consistent with the store and, in case of success, adds the provider's partner name to a list (by exploiting an internal service List, that provides operations o addT oList and o askList ). After δ time units from the initialization of the local store, the loop is terminated by executing a kill activity and the current list of providers for service type x type is sent to the client. Notably, reading a description in the database, in this case, consists of an input along p reg
• o DB followed by an output along p reg • o pub ; this way we are guaranteed that, after being consumed, the description is correctly added to the database. It is worth noticing that service descriptions are non-deterministically retrieved, thus the same provider can occur in the returned list many times. This could be avoided by refining the specification, e.g. by tagging each service description with an index (stored in an additional field) that is then exploited to read the descriptions in an ordered way.
After that the user's car breaks down and Orchestrator is triggered, the service Discovery of the in-vehicle platform will receive from Orchestrator a request containing the GPS data of the car, that it stores in x loc , and a string identifying the kind of the required services (see the specification in Section 3.2). By exploiting the latter information, it will know that it has to search a garage, a tow truck and a rental car service. For example, the component taking care of discovering a garage service can be
where the constraint dist(x loc , gps) < 20 means that the required garages must be less than 20 km far from the stranded car's actual location. Once the discovery phase terminates and Reasoner communicates the best garage service to Orchestrator, the latter and the selected garage engage in a negotiation phase in order to sign an SLA. First, Orchestrator invokes the operation o order provided by the selected garage (see orderGarage definition at page 8); then, it starts the negotiation by performing an operation tell that adds Orchestrator's local constraints (i.e. constraints with restricted constraint variables) to the shared global store; finally, it synchronizes with the garage service, by invoking o sync , for sharing its local constraints with it.
In our example, the constraints states that for a repair in less than two days the driver is disposed to spend up to 1500 Euros, otherwise he is ready to spend less than 800 Euros.
After the synchronization with Orchestrator, the selected garage service tries to impose its first-rate constraint c = ((cost > 2000 ∧ 6 < duration < 24) ∨ (cost > 1500 ∧ duration 24)) and, if it fails to reach an agreement within δ time units, weakens the requirements and retries with constraint c = ((cost > 1700 ∧ 6 < duration < 24) ∨ (cost > 1200 ∧ duration 24)). Both constraints are specifically generated by the garage service for the occurred engine failure, by exploiting the transmitted diagnostic data. After δ time units, if also the second attempt fails, it gives up the negotiation. This negotiation task is modelled as follows:
Notably, operations tell cannot be used as guards for the choice operator. Thus, a term like tell c. s + e . s should be considered as an abbreviation for
Intuitively, if the constraint c is consistent with the store, the timer can be stopped (i.e. communication along p • o makes a choice and removes the wait activity) and, then, the constraint can be added to the store. Otherwise, if the timeout expires, the constraint cannot be added to the store.
A type system for checking confidentiality properties
The type system for COWS introduced in [13] permits expressing and forcing policies regulating the exchange of data among interacting services and ensuring that, in that respect, services do not manifest unexpected behaviours. This enables us to check confidentiality properties, e.g., that critical data such as credit card information are shared only with authorized partners. The type system has been obtained by tailoring to COWS the type-based approach for protecting data in distributed systems put forward in [8] , in the context of a higher-order functional programming language, and drawn on in [4] , in that of a language for mobile agents.
The types express the policies for data exchange in terms of regions, i.e. sets of service partner names attachable to each single datum. Service programmers can thus settle the partners usable to exchange any given datum (and, then, the services that can share it), thus avoiding the datum be accessed (by unwanted services) through unauthorized partners. Then, a type inference system (statically) performs some coherence checks (e.g. the service used in an invocation must belong to the regions of all data occurring in the argument of the invocation) and derives the minimal region annotations for variable declarations that ensure consistency of services initial configuration. COWS operational semantics uses these annotations in very efficient checks (i.e. subset inclusions) to authorise or block transitions, in order to guarantee that computations proceed according to them. This property, called soundness, can be stated as follows: a service s is sound if, for any datum v in s associated to region r and for all evolutions of s, it holds that v can be exchanged only by using services in r. As a consequence of the type soundness of the language, it follows that well-typed services always comply with the policies regulating the exchange of data among interacting services.
We illustrate now some relevant properties for the on road assistance scenario. Firstly, a driver in trouble must be assured that information about his credit card and his location cannot become available to unauthorized users. Thus, for example, the credit card identifier ccNum, communicated by activity requestCardCharge to service Bank, gets annotated with the policy {p bank }, that allows Bank to receive the datum but prevents it from transmitting the datum to other services. Other non-critical data, e.g. amount, can be transmitted without an attached policy. The typed version of requestCardCharge (where irrelevant fault/compensation details are omitted) is defined as follows
Notably, the annotations set by programmers are written as a subscript of the datum to which they refer to. Instead, the annotations put by the type inference, to better distinguish them from those put by the programmers, are written as a superscript of the variable declaration to which they refer to. Thus, the syntax of variable delimitation becomes [{x} r ] s, which means that the datum that dynamically will replace x will be used in s at most by the partners belonging to the region r. Hence, once the type inference phase ends, Bank gets annotated as follows
Indeed, the annotations inferred for variables x cust , x cc and x amount are derived from the use of these variables made by Bank. Thus, they are assigned region {p bank } because they are only used in the receive along p bank
• o charge and, of course, the partner name of the endpoint must belong to the region of the variables.
Suppose instead that service Bank (accidentally or maliciously) attempts to reveal the credit card number through some 'internal' operation such as p int
• o! {x cc } r , for some region r. For Bank to successfully complete the type inference phase, we should have p int ∈ r. Then, as result of the inference, we would get the annotated variable declaration [{x cc } r ] , for some region r with r ⊆ r . Now, the interaction between the typed terms requestCardCharge and Bank would be blocked by the runtime checks because the datum sent by requestCardCharge would be annotated as {ccNum} {p bank } while the region r of the receiving variable x cc is such that p int ∈ r ⊆ r {p bank }. When delivering a datum, we can specify different policies according to the invoked service. For example, when sending the car's current location stored in x loc to services orderTowTruck and orderRentalCar, we annotate it with the regions {x towT ruck } and {x rentalCar }, respectively. This means that the corresponding service invocations get annotated as follows:
Notably, the used policies are not fixed at design time, but depend on the partner variables x towT ruck and x rentalCar , and, thus, will be determined by the services that these variables will be bound to as computation proceeds. For example, consider a towing truck service annotated as follows:
Now, the car's current location can be communicated to the towing truck if, and only if, the region of the variable x carLoc that, after communication, will store the datum and the region of x loc do comply, i.e. r 2 ⊆ {p towT ruck }.
As a final example, the on road services could want to guarantee that critical data sent to the in vehicle services, such as cost and quality of the service supplied, are not disclosed to competitors. For example, suppose that the towing truck services, like TowTruck before, must send the estimated travel time (ET T ) to clients. To prevent this datum be sent to competitor services, ET T is communicated with an attached policy that only authorizes the client partner to access it, as in the following activity
x client
• o towT ruckOK ! towTruckNum, {ET T } {x client }
A logical framework for verifying functional properties
The logical verification framework introduced in [6] permits checking functional properties of services by abstracting away from the computational contexts in which they are operating. Specifically, services are abstractly considered as entities capable of accepting requests, delivering corresponding responses and, on-demand, cancelling requests, over specified interactions. The 'abstract' service actions are the following: and f ail(i, c) characterise actions that correspond to a response, a cancellation and a failure notification, respectively, of the interaction i. The name of the interaction or the correlation tuple will be omitted whenever they are not relevant.
To formalize properties of services, we have defined the service-oriented logic SocL. This logic combines the action paradigm of ACTL [5] with predicates that are true over states and is, therefore, interpreted over Doubly Labelled Transition System (L 2 TS, [17] ). A key novelty of SocL is the possibility to specify parametric formulae to correlate service requests to the corresponding answers. Technically, correlation tuples in the actions of SocL formulae can use variables. Let var be a correlation variable name; we use $var to indicate the binder of the occurrences %var. For example, request(i, $var ) denotes a request action for the interaction i that is uniquely identified through the correlation variable $var. This way, subsequent actions, corresponding e.g. to response to that specific request, can unambiguously refer it through %var.
SocL allows us to express several relevant abstract properties for the services within the on road assistance scenario. A few examples follow.
AG accepting request(engineFailure)
This formula means that the service Orchestrator is available, i.e. it is always capable to accept a request for the interaction engineFailure. Indeed, a formula like AG φ holds in a state q of a given L 2 TS if, and only if, the formula φ holds in q and in all the states reachable from q along each path starting from q. accepting request(engineFailure) is an atomic proposition that can hold or not in a state of the L 2 TS and means that the service is able to accept a request for the interaction engineFailure.
AG [request(garage, $car )] AF response(garage, %car )∨ f ail(garage, %car ) true
This formula means that all garage services contacted by Orchestrator are responsive, i.e. they always guarantee a response to each received request. Indeed, a formula like [γ] φ means that in the next state of any path, reached by an action satisfying the action formula γ, the formula φ holds; a formula like AF γ φ holds in a state q if, and only if, φ holds in q or in one of the states reachable from q (by a last action satisfying γ) along each path starting from q. Notably, responses (both positive and negative) from the contacted garage service belongs to the same interaction garage of the garage appointment request and are correlated by the variable car.
¬E(true ¬ response(charge) U request(garage)∨request(rentalCar) true)
This formula means that a garage or a rental car request can be processed only after the driver's credit card has been successfully charged. Indeed, ¬ is the negation operator and E(φ χ U γ φ ) is the until operator, that means that there exists a path starting from the current state for which φ holds at the starting state or at a future state (reached by an action satisfying γ), and φ has to hold until that state is reached (by executing unobservable actions or actions satisfying χ). This formula means that, if renting a car succeeds and finding a tow truck fails, then the rental car order must be cancelled (because the car must be redirected to the driver's current location). Notably, the cancelling request belongs to the same Fig. 2 . Excerpt of the concrete L 2 TS for the on road assistance scenario interaction rentalCar of the rent confirmation and they are correlated by the variable rentalNum.
EF f ail(rentalCar) EF response(towT ruck) true
This formula means that if renting a car fails, tow truck (and, therefore, garage appointment) can succeed.
AG [ f ail(towT ruck)] AF cancel(garage) true
This formula means that if finding a tow truck fails, the garage appointment will be revoked.
¬E(true ¬ response(garage) U request(towT ruck) true)
This formula means that before looking for a tow truck, a garage must be found.
To check if a COWS term enjoys some abstract properties expressed as SocL formulae, the following four steps must be performed. Firstly, the semantics of the COWS term is defined by using an LTS. Secondly, this LTS is transformed into an L 2 TS by labelling each state with the set of actions the COWS term is able to perform immediately from that state. Of course, the transformation preserves the structure of the original COWS LTS. For example, the concrete L 2 TS obtained by applying this transformation to the on road assistance scenario is shown in Figure 2 . Notably, in our L 2 TS arcs are labelled by set of actions, rather than by single actions as it is usual.
Thirdly, since we are interested in verifying abstract properties of services, such as those shown before, we need to abstract away from unnecessary details by transforming concrete actions into 'abstract' ones. This is done by means of suitable abstraction rules that replace the concrete labels on the transitions with abstract actions (i.e. Most of the rule are self-explicative, we comment on the remaining ones. Variables "$n" (with n natural number) are used to define parametric abstraction rules. Also the wildcard " * " is used for increasing flexibility. The fourth and fifth rules prescribe that whenever an action over endpoints p garage 1
• o order or p garage 2
• o order with sent data p car , data (that match $1, * ) occurs in the label of a transition, then it is replaced by the abstract action request(garage, p car ). This way, the car partner name p car can be used to correlate responses from the contacted garage service. Similarly, the second-last rule prescribes that whenever an action over the operation o redirect with sent data rentalNum, gps occurs in the label of a transition, then it is replaced by cancel(rentalCar, rentalNum ). The last rule works similarly, but it applies to labels of states rather than to labels of transitions.
Finally, the SocL formulae are checked over the abstract L 2 TS. To assist the verification process, one can use CMC [1] , that is, besides an interpreter for COWS terms, a model checker for SocL formulae over L 2 TS. One can thus verify that, as expected, all the abstract properties we introduced before do hold for the COWS specification of on road assistance scenario, but the first property, because Orchestrator is not a persistent service capable of accepting and serving multiple requests (i.e. as we noted in Section 3.2 it can only perform one recovery task at a time).
Concluding remarks
COWS falls within a main line of research that aims at developing process calculi capable of capturing the basic aspects of service-oriented systems and, possibly, of supporting the analysis of qualitative and quantitative properties of services. We have demonstrated that one can use COWS to model all the phases of the life cycle of SOC applications, such as publication, discovery, negotiation, deployment and execution. The methods and tools we have described for expressing and checking properties of services are certainly an important added value of using COWS as a modelling language.
The fact that several relevant aspects of SOC systems can be suitably addressed and dealt with in an homogeneous and direct way by using a single linguistic low-level formalism somehow suggests that COWS could serve as a common and convenient basis to enable analysis of service-oriented applications by translation from higher level languages. As further steps in this direction, we are currently studying translations from the service orchestration language WS-BPEL [18] and the S Reference Modelling Language SRML [7] into COWS. A short-term goal of this activity is to define, via translation in COWS, an operational semantics for these two high level languages. A long-term goal is to enable using proof techniques and analytical tools developed for COWS, such as the type system and the logical verification framework summed up in this paper, and the stochastic extension defined in [19] , to analyse service-oriented applications programmed in WS-BPEL or modelled in SRML.
